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IS THE RIGHT TO DIE DEAD?
Vincent J. Samar*

INTRODUCTION

On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
rejected two facial challenges to laws prohibiting physician-assisted
suicide in the states of Washington and New York.I In Washington v.
Glucksberg,2 several terminally-ill patients, their physicians, and various state officials challenged Washington's criminal prohibition of
physician-assisted suicide on the ground that the statute violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Vacco v.
Quill,3 a similar group of plaintiffs challenged a New York statute
which allowed a terminally-ill patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment, yet prohibited any person from assisting the patient in terminating his or her own life. Here however, the plaintiffs challenged the
statute under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In this essay, I maintain that the issue of whether the right to die is
viable as a constitutionally protectable right remains open. I intend to
reconcile the Court's holdings in Glucksberg and Quill by examining
the different rationales the Justices offered for their decisions. I do
not believe this issue can be resolved simply by asserting that the intention of the actor is different when assisting suicide, as compared to
when life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn. Rather, the right to die
continues to be viable due to the level of abstraction at which the
Court chose to frame the issue in these cases.
In Glucksberg and Quill, the Court may have sought to avoid progressing ahead of the political process. On their face, the holdings in
Glucksberg and Quill were viewed by the Court as a means of resolving the difficult mix of issues, including the protection of a patient's
*

Vincent J. Samar is an adjunct professor of philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago and

Oakton Community College. He is also an adjunct professor of law at Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. See Linda Greenhouse, No Help for the Dying; But Justices Leave Door Open to a Future

Claim of a Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997, § 1, at 1.
2. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
3. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
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true intentions. 4 However, had the Court chosen to frame the issue at
a higher level of abstraction, it may have reached a more liberal result.
However, choosing this methodology may have raised other issues
that the Court was not ready or willing to address. For example, specifying the procedures for terminating life, and determining the bound5
ary lines for assessing whether the patient desires to die.
Thus, this article will focus on two questions. First, why did the
Court choose to frame the issue at a lower level of abstraction? Second, what factors would encourage framing the issue differently in the
future? Glucksberg and Quill are interesting, not so much because of
what the Court held, but rather because of what it did not hold. The
latter may have the greater impact on decisions in future cases.
This impact is a product both of what the Court did, and what it
failed to do, in Glucksberg and Quill. The latter restrains the former.
However, the latter is also restrained due to moral disagreement in
our society pertaining to what the right to die means, if the right even
exists, and to whom it applies. As a result, courts reluctantly enter
into this debate. 6 In this essay, I will follow two principal themes.
First, this article will make coherent the language of the various concurring opinions that illustrate the reasons Justice O'Connor joined
the majority opinion and why the other Justices joined in the result.
Second, this article illustrates how a broader moral analysis provides
further guidance for courts that may confront this same issue in the
future. 7 In particular, I focus on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion because, as I contend in this analysis, I believe her opinion represents more of an attachment to the particular facts of these two cases,
rather than an agreement with the majority on broad principles of law
governing the right to die.
II.

THE ACTUAL DECISIONS OF THE COURT

In Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five member
majority (including Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and O'Connor),
4. Cass Sunstein characterizes this issue as an example of how the Court seeks to protect its
own constitutional legitimacy in a context where the following circumstances exist: religious
convictions are not excessive, there is a place for considered public judgments, and there exists
little inequality or prejudice. See CASS SUNS'rEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
THE SUPREME COURT, (1999) 98-104.

ON

5. Id. at 104.

6. See infra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
7. But see RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AN)

(arguing against the use of moral theory in legal decision making).

LEGAL THEORY (1999)
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engaged in the backward-looking approach of due process analysis. 8
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted at the outset that "we begin [our analysis], as we do in all due process cases, by examining our nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist then
reviewed the early history of the law in the right to die area by stating
that "for 700 years, the Anglo-American common law tradition has
punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide." 10 During the colonial period, state legislatures similarly disapproved of the practice of assisted suicide. Although in recent years,
some states have been willing to reexamine these policies, many have
concluded in favor of retaining an out-right prohibition. 1 For instance, in 1975, the Washington State Legislature decided to prohibit
assisted suicides, though for years it allowed, and continues to allow, a
12
personal choice to withhold life-sustaining treatment.
In Glucksberg, the Court was also concerned that the Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest it was being asked to protect, would halt
public debate on the ethical, legal, and practical aspects of the issue.
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained:
We 'have always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision-making
in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.' . . . [B]y extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of
public debate and legislative action. We must therefore 'exercise the
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this
field,' . . . lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be
subtly transformed
into the policy preferences of the members of
13
this Court.
The excerpt demonstrates the Court's intent to avoid substituting its
judgment for that of elected policymakers. In this sense, the argument
supports a preference for a representative democracy.
8. Cass Sunstein has suggested this difference between due process and equal protection
analyses:
The Due Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to the due process
issue whether an existing or time-honored convention, described at the appropriate
level of generality, is violated by the practice under attack. By contrast, the Equal
Protection Clause looks forward, serving to invalidate practices that were widespread
at the time of its ratification and that were expected to endure. The two clauses therefore, operate along different tracks.
Cass Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution:A Note on the Relationship Between Due
Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 1161, 1163-79 (1988).
9. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
10. Id.at 711.
11. Id.at 712-16.
12. Id.at 716-17.
13. Id. at 720.
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Additionally, the Glucksberg Court noted that even in a prior case,
where the Court assumed there was a right to discontinue unwanted
medical treatment, it did not deduce such a right "from abstract concepts of personal autonomy.' 1 4 Rather, the Court followed a longstanding common law tradition that treated forced medication as battery.' 5 Strategically, the Court avoided being forced to recognize the
right to die on any grounds other than common-law precedent.
However, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that the facts of
a future case may persuade it to hold differently. In leaving the question open, the Court conceded that foreclosing the issue would not
carry public support in cases involving a different factual circumstance
where a person might be exposed to unbearable suffering. As a pragmatic result, the majority was also able to obtain Justice O'Connor's
vote. Regardless of the Court's motives, footnote 24 of the majority
opinion explicitly states that the Court did not foreclose the possibility
that an individual plaintiff, in a more particularized challenge, may
have a claim to seek a physician's assistance in hastening his own
death.16 However, the Court did illustrate that such a claim would be
radically different than the one presented in Glucksberg.'7
In Quill, the Court followed the forward-looking approach of equal
protection analysis.' 8 Again, writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist framed the issue as whether the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals correctly reversed the district court. The district court recognized "a difference between allowing nature to take its course, even in
the most severe situations, and intentionally using an artificial deathproducing device."' 9 Criticizing the court of appeal's reversal, Chief
Justice Rehnquist adopted the district court's distinction between a
physician withdrawing life-sustaining treatment for the terminally-ill,
and a physician acting affirmatively to assist in his patient's death.
Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the Second Circuit's
holding stating:
[S]ome terminally ill people-those who are on life-support systems-are treated differently than those who are not, in that the
14. Id. at 725 (discussing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 467 U.S. 261, 280
(1990i)). However, this may not have been an accurate representation of what the Court held in
Cruzan. In Cruzan, the Court treated the right to die as a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause, not as a fundamental right to privacy. See id. at
278-79: see also VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVAcY: GAYS, LESBIANS AND THE CONSTITUTIION 198 (1991).

15. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725.
16. Id. at 735 n.24.
17. Id.

18. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 1162-79.
19. Quill, 521 U.S. at 798.
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former may 'hasten death' by ending treatment, but the latter may
not 'hasten death' through physician-assisted suicide ....This con-

clusion depends on the submission that ending or refusing life sustaining medical treatment 'is nothing more or less than assisted
suicide.'

. .

. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we think the distinction

between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment,
a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profestraditions, is both important and logical; it is
sion and in our legal
20
certainly rational.
The primary justification for the Chief Justice's conclusion was that
"the distinction comports with fundamental legal principles of causation and intent. First, when a patient refuses life-sustaining medical
treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or pathology, but if
a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is
2
killed by that medication." '
In essence, the Court treated the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment differently from that of euthanasia. Some commentators have
labeled such action passive euthanasia. In other words, allowing
someone to die, as opposed to actively causing their death. 22 A distinction is drawn between an outside intentional act that causes death,
and an action that appears to be devoid of such intention. 23 In Glucksberg and Quill, the Court did not overtly adopt this distinction. However, as I will argue, the Court implied the distinction by asserting that
so long as the removal of life-sustaining treatment was protected by
statute, such action satisfied any constitutional requirement for liberty. The significance of this interpretation illustrates the limited
precedential value that these cases have toward resolving future cases.
As Justice Stevens articulated in his concurring opinion, no real difference exists between assisted suicide and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, or if a difference does exist, it has yet to be fully
delineated. As will be shown below, assuming a difference may be
demonstrated, the difference cannot be confined merely to the content of the actor's intention.
In Quill, the Court did not discuss whether a heightened form of
scrutiny, as is applied in race and gender cases, might also be appropriate when an individual is denied a physician's assistance to end his
life. Specifically, the Court did not discuss whether terminally-ill patients constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class warranting a higher
20. Id. at 800-01.
21. Id. at 801.
22. JAMES RACHELS, Euthanasia, Killing, and Letting Die, in
Sterba, 1984).
23. Id.

MORALITY IN PRACTICE

165 (J.
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degree of protection. 24 Of course, the right to die cases do not contain
characteristics that are historically the basis for invidious discriminatory practices. More importantly, the Court's failure to apply a
heightened form of scrutiny, despite that the liberty interest involved
a fundamental right, implied that the Court did not believe the liberty
interest at issue constituted a fundamental right. 25 Rather, the Court
merely applied the rationality test. Thus, the Court inquired only
whether New York's reasons for passing the legislation possessed a
rational relation to its governmental responsibilities. Citing Glucksberg, the Court treated its discussion of Washington's reasons to further amplify and justify, as a matter of equal protection, New York's
similar rationale for restricting physician-assisted suicide. 26 In Glucksberg, the Court stated that
Washington has an 'unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life.' . . . [T]he State also has an interest in protecting the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession .... Next, the State
has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor,
the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and mistakes .... The State's interest here goes beyond protecting the vulnerable from coercion; it extends to protecting disabled and
terminally-ill people from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and 'societal indifference.' . . . [T]he state may fear that permitting assisted suicide will start27it down the path to voluntary and
perhaps involuntary euthanasia.
As noted in Glucksberg and Quill, the Justices were unanimous only
in their judgment. Therefore, particular attention must be paid to the
way the Justices differed in their concurring opinions. In these concurring opinions, the tenuous nature of the Court's decision to view
Glucksberg and Quill at a certain level of abstraction, and under a
certain characterization, was given acute recognition by its own members. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a five member majority that
24. The standard test for a suspect classification is whether: (1) the group has suffered a
history of purposeful discrimination, (2) contrary to the ideals of equal protection, and (3) lacks
the political power necessary to obtain redress. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.. 473 U.S. 432, 440-44 (1985). Race and national origin are good examples of where the
Court has applied strict scrutiny to a classification. LAURENCE. H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-

TIONAL LAW 14-16, 1466-79 (2nd ed. 1988). An intermediate level of scrutiny applies to gender
discrimination because, in some limited contexts, it is thought that basis for discrimination exists.
Otherwise, equal protection only requires a rational relation between what the state proposes
and a legitimate government interest. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTI'UTIONAi

LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE

610 (1999).

25. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 766-67 (Souter, J. concurring) (citing Justice Harlan's dissent

in Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961): Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993); and
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).

26. Quill, 521 U.S. at 808-09.
27. Glacksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-33 (referenced in Quill, 521 U.S. at 808-09.).
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was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and O'Connor. Justice O'Connor, however, also wrote a concurring opinion joined by,
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer.
In Justice O'Connor's concurrence, she explained her position:
I agree that there is no generalized right to 'commit suicide.' But
respondents urge us to address the narrower question [of] whether a
mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has
a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death. I see no reason to reach that
challenge in the context of the facial challenges of the New York
and Washington laws at issue here ....The parties and amici agree
that in these States a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness
and who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining
medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate suffering, even to
the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.2 8
Justice O'Connor's concurrence suggests that her agreement with the
majority is related more to the facts of these two cases, rather than
any broad principle regarding the manners in which a state may regulate individuals facing imminent death. Justice O'Connor's concurrence and the concurrences of Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer,
are better explained as efforts to avoid getting ahead of public sentiment on the issue of euthanasia, by making a proclamation concerning
the right to physician-assisted suicide that was greater than the specific cases merited. However, such an institutional concern fails to illustrate the factual circumstances which may persuade Justice
O'Connor, or the remaining Justices, to decide a future case
differently.
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, emphasized the categorical nature of the facial challenge. Justice Stevens began by noting that
the State had an "interest in preserving and fostering the benefits that
every human being may provide to the community, a community that
thrives on the exchange of ideas, expressions of affection, shared
memories and humorous incidents, as well as on the material contributions that its members create and support. '29 However, Justice Stevens emphasized that these interests did not support a right to life that
30
was absolute, as is embodied by Washington's death penalty statute.
He criticized the majority by recognizing that the right to refuse treatment had its foundation, not in the common law of battery, but rather
in a concept of freedom "older than the common law" that recognizes
28. Id. at 736-37.
29. Id.at 741 (Stevens, J. concurring).
30. Id. at 741-42.
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not merely a person's right to refuse a particular kind of unwanted
treatment, but also her interest in dignity, and in determining the
character of the memories that will survive long after her death ....
Whatever the outer limits of the concept may be, it definitely includes protection for matters 'central to personal dignity and autonomy.' . . . [A]voiding intolerable pain and the indignity of living
one's final days incapacitate[d]
and in agony is certainly 'at the
31
heart of [this] liberty.'
Justice Stevens continued by citing Cruzan for the proposition that
"[a]lthough there is no absolute right to physician-assisted suicide ...
some individuals who no longer have the option of deciding whether
to live or to die because they are already on the threshold of death
have a constitutionally protected interest that may outweigh the
State's interest in preserving life at all costs." ' 32 Justice Stevens further
noted that "the State's interest in the contributions each person may
make to society [may] not have the same force for a terminally ill
patient faced not with a choice of whether to live, only of how to
die.'33
Justice Stevens was especially critical of the Court's reliance on the
distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment, stating as follows: "There may be little distinction between
the intent of a terminally-ill patient who decides to remove her life
support and one who seeks the assistance of a doctor in ending her
life; in both situations, the patient is seeking to hasten a certain, impending death. '34 Justice Stevens stated that
[t]he doctor's intent might also be the same in prescribing lethal
medication as it is in terminating life support. A doctor who fails to
administer medical treatment to one who is dying from a disease
could be doing so with an intent to harm or kill that patient. Conversely, a doctor who prescribes lethal medication does not necessarily intend the patient's death-rather that doctor may seek to
35
simply ease the patient's suffering and to comply with her wishes.
Justice Stevens concluded that
[t]he illusory character of any differences in intent or causation is
confirmed by the fact that the American Medical Association unequivocally endorses the practice of terminal sedation-the administration of sufficient dosages of pain-killing medication to
terminally ill patients to protect them from excruciating 36pain even
when it is clear that the time of death will be advanced.
31. Id. at 743-45.

32. Id. at 745.
33. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 746.
34. Id. at 750.

35. Id. at 750-51.
36. Id. at 757.
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In short, Justice Stevens criticized the manner in which the majority
framed the issue. Specifically, Justice Stevens asserted that the majority attempted to avoid dealing with a complex normative issue by relying on an apparent analytic distinction, the difference between
assisted suicide and the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment.
The drawing of such analytical distinctions is not a new tactic for
lawyers or philosophers. Recently, this tactic was utilized in cases
where plaintiffs asserted that state marriage laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by prohibiting samesex marriages. 37 In those cases, opponents of same-sex marriages argued that marriage, by definition, is a relationship between a man and
a woman. In this manner, the opponents of same-sex marriages
strived to limit the equal protection analysis by illustrating that the
institution of marriage is available to everyone on the same basis. 38 As
a result, proponents of same-sex marriages face an uphill battle in attempting to persuade courts to look behind the definition of marriage
in order to reach the fundamental concerns of the parties in such
39
cases.
In contrast to Justice Stevens' more restrictive autonomy-based approach, Justice Souter's concurring opinion takes a communitarian
line. Rather than evaluating the facts of each case, Justice Souter deferred to the history and tradition of the Due Process Clause. Justice
Souter maintained that:
Due Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be
said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between the liberty
and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content
to this constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational pro37. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187. 1192. cert. denied. 84 Wash.2d 1008 (1974) (citing
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973)) in which the court concluded that
the State of Washington's marriage statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage did not violate the
state constitution's equal rights amendment because "appellants are not being denied entry into
the marriage relationship because of their sex; rather, they are being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one which may be
entered into only by two persons who are members of the opposite sex." Id. As the court
observed in Jones: "In substance, the relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize
the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is not a marriage." Id.
38. This strategy is obviously a smokescreen to avoid the real issue, which is how marriage
ought to be defined if it is to pass constitutional muster. But the smokescreen sometimes works,
demonstrating that the choice of level of abstraction with which to view an issue is all-important
to its resolution.
39. For a number of different viewpoints on what the political question doctrine means and
what its significance is in the law, see TRIBE, supra note 24 at 96-97.
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cess, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free
roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance
which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard
what history teaches are the traditions from
which it developed
4
well as the traditions from which it broke. 11

to
of
to
as

At this point, Justice Souter's view also raises questions about the
scope of the right to die, as well as how its extension is to be
determined.
In terms of the level of generality used to analyze this case, Justice
Souter noted that we may classify the "proper analysis in any of these
ways: as applying concepts of normal critical reasoning, as pointing to
the need to attend to the levels of generality at which countervailing
interests are stated, or as examining the concrete application of principles for fitness with their own ostensible justifications."'4 1 However we
choose to undertake the analysis, it certainly requires greater detail
than previously done.
Justice Souter characterized the respondents' rights in Glucksberg
and Quill as referring to the rights of one narrow class. Justice Souter
further examined the state's claim that such rights could not be adequately confined. In particular, he was concerned with the state's argument that different judgments of mental intent would ultimately
force a decision in respondents' favor. Such a slippery slope could
lead to circumstances where vulnerable and nonconsenting individuals
could no longer be protected. In this sense, one might draw a further
distinction between not only active and passive euthanasia, but also
42
between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.
Courts and juries often deal with issues of mental intent. An example is when the finder of fact determines the guilt or innocence of a
person charged with first degree murder. Of course, such a decision
occurs within a controlled environment where evidence of intent is
considered under the guideposts of strict rules. Justice Souter was
concerned that if even a limited right to die were recognized, a liberal40. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 773.
42. Drawing these two distinctions creates a matrix in which active and passive euthanasia can
be related to voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. In this instance, one sees the threat to liberty increase as one moves from passive/voluntary euthanasia (where it is almost nonexistent) to
active/involuntary euthanasia. Hence, here we find some reason for the Court to exhibit reluctance with too sweeping a protection for a right to die. See, e.g., Susan R. Martyn and Henry J.
Bourguignon, Physician Assisted Suicide: The Lethal Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions, 85 CAL. L. REV. 371, 384 (1997) (discussing the danger of blurring the line between physician-assisted suicide and letting someone die, and the philosophical, moral and pragmatic
philosophies to maintain a distinction between the two); see also Antonion P. Tsarouhas, Comment, The Case Against Legal Assisted Suicide, 20 OHio N.U. L. REV. 793, 812-14 (1993) (arguing that assisted suicide places a questionable value on human life).
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izing progression may result. In such a situation, the issue often becomes how serious the illness is required to be, and what criteria
govern the giving of consent, "until ultimately doctors and others
would abuse a limited freedom to aid suicides by yielding to the impulse to end another's suffering under conditions going beyond the
narrow limits the respondents propose. '43 Thus, for Justice Souter,
"[tihe case for the slippery slope is fairly made out.., because there is
a plausible case [for believing] that the right claimed would not be
readily containable" amidst the various competing temptations that
44
might affect a physician's judgment.
Although the possibility of a slippery slope raises the difficult issue
of when hastening death might be appropriate, it by no means decides
the question. This is particularly true where great pain may be experienced prior to death. Justice Breyer expressed precisely this argument in his concurring opinion.
I would not reject the respondents' claim without considering a different formulation, for which our legislative tradition may provide
greater support. That formulation would use words roughly like a
right to die with dignity. I do not believe, however, that this Court
need or now should decide whether or not such a right is 'fundamental.' That is because, in my view, the avoidance of severe pain
(connected with death) would have to constitute an essential part of
any successful claim and because, as Justice O'Connor points out,
the laws45before us do not force a dying person to undergo that kind
of pain.
Implicit in these views is a further distinction between Justices emphasizing a more fundamental rights approach, specifically Justice Stevens, and in some instances Justice Breyer, and those Justices who
adopt a more communitarian analysis, such as Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, and Souter. The difference between a communitarian and
a fundamental rights approach is that the former assumes the content
of the right encompasses accepted practices of community life, while
the latter treats the content of the right to be universal and barren of
specific collateral or historical content. At this point, I ignore whether
either approach serves politically liberal or conservative causes.
While the latter factors may be present, their emphasis here would

concurring). Apparently, determining who is ter43. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 790 (Breyer, J.,
minally ill also raises a number of difficulties. See Yale Kamisar, The Right to Die: On Drawing
(and Erasing) Lines, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 516-17 (1996).

44. Glucksberg 521, U.S. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring)
45. Id. at 790-91 (Breyer, J.,concurring).
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quickly sidetrack us from understanding how the various concurring
46
rationales work to determine future cases.
At least in Glucksberg and Quill, the distinction between both the
communitarian and fundamental rights approaches seems to account
for some of the differences in emphasis between the underlying concurring rationales. 47 However, I would like to suggest that this difference be construed in another way, in context to the subtler differences
in the level of abstraction implicit within the different concurrences.
When these cases are viewed at a lower level of abstraction, what I
have labeled as the internal point of view, a more communitarian approach based on values implicit in society's practices tends to dominate. However, this approach gives way to a more fundamental rights
approach, which appeals to abstract principles outside the social practice, when those very practices are called into question. This shift will
soon become clear when I discuss the problem of drawing a distinction
between active euthanasia and the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment.
In Glucksberg, the Court was asked to determine whether the right

to assisted suicide might be protected as a liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 48 In Quill, the issue
was framed as whether allowing one group of terminally-ill patients,
those on life support, to opt-out of treatment while not granting

others a physician's assistance to end their lives, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 49 In treating these two
cases together, and suggesting a fairly moderate level of abstraction, a
strategy emerges for how the Court will decide future cases in this
area. In Glucksberg, the Court held that no general right to assisted
suicide existed. However, in Quill, the Court sought to limit the
breadth of that decision by allowing people to opt-out of prolonged
life-sustaining treatments.
When the Court adopted "assisted suicide" as its characterization of
the physician's actions in Glucksberg, it no doubt believed that it effectively closed the door to a due process challenge because the implied right to suicide is not a "time-honored tradition." Nevertheless,
46. Indeed, strict adherence to political views may play a role, but only at the point where the
legal system can no longer operate independent of a broader theory of political morality if justice is to be served. See VINCENT J. SAMAR, JUSTIFYING JUDGMENT: PRACTICING LAW AND
PimiOSOPiiiY 61-89 (1998).

47. See Roger S. Magnusson. The Sanctity of Life and the Right to Die: Social Jurisprudential
Aspects of the Euthanasia Debate in Australia and the United States, 6 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1,
81 (1997).

48. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06.
49. Quill, 521 U.S. at 796-97.
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as I will argue, an effective due process challenge remains a possibility
if the correct moral analysis is utilized. Even accepting what the
Court may have hoped, that the method of a due process challenge
was finally put to rest, an alternative approach remains open to protect the right to die via an equal protection challenge, as was done in

Quill.
The challenge in Quill required a showing that New York had either
unfairly discriminated against those who sought physician-assistance
to end their lives because it allowed others to withdraw life sustaining
services, or a showing that the state's prohibition of such assistance
was irrational. However, the Court did not address the fact that
others could withdraw life sustaining services in Quill, and found New
York's prohibition to be rational. Thus, the Court was able to set
aside the equal protection argument, at least for the time being.
In Glucksberg and Quill, the Court held that if the option to withdraw life-sustaining treatment remains, other forms of so-called mercy
killings could be prohibited. However, this rationale gives rise to the
deeper moral question of why the opt-out provision is constitutionally
protected while active euthanasia does not receive such protection.
Obviously, this analysis is not the only plausible interpretation of
Glucksberg and Quill. Other interpretations from different perspectives could also be advanced. However, the majority of these interpretations would not be as closely related to the actual doctrine that
the Court claimed to be applying, that there was no constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide. Consequently, this article's interpretation is valuable because it allows one to morally assess the reasons that the Court claimed to be using when it chose the
characterizations of assisted suicide and withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment.
Evaluating Glucksberg and Quill together suggests the possibility
that the right to die is not a fundamental constitutional right. Under
the interpretation I have suggested, these two cases represent factual
situations where such a right would not control, even though the state
was not required to show a compelling interest for why the right
should be overridden. 50 Thus, implicit in these two cases is the
Court's intention to limit, at least for the time being, the scope and
protection of any due process or equal protection challenge to state
50. The point here is that a right may be valid even when it is overridden, that is when it is
justifiably infringed because "there is sufficient justification for not carrying out the correlative
duty." Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION 219 (1982).
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laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. 5 1 Under such an interpretation, if the right to physician-assisted suicide exists, it is only when
necessary to offset great pain and suffering. 52 This interpretation is
different from a more general right to physician-assisted suicide, even
when considered under the rubric of the right to privacy. The degree
of generality, as evidenced by the particular interpretation adopted, is
crucial to the way these cases are resolved. Accordingly, the degree of
generality in the Court's characterizations of these cases is directly
related to the strategy on how these cases were decided by the Court.
Nevertheless, the remaining question is if the Court was morally justified in deciding these cases in such a manner that a system of constitutional government could legitimately affirm the decisions.
III.

THE META-PRINCIPLES BY WHICH COURTS DECIDE CASES

I propose that courts should, and often do, decide cases which fit a
three-tiered model, especially where constitutional rights are involved. 53 The first tier is the decision itself and accompanying positive
law. 54 In many cases, the first tier is adequate to decide the matter
because the principles are not in controversy, and the question is
strictly one of determining the relevant facts. However, on occasion
the positive law, either on its face or as applied, is inconsistent or appears unjust.55 As a result, courts must then appeal to a second tier.
In the case of constitutional principles, for example, the need to
appeal to a second tier may arise because a constitutional provision is
interpreted too narrowly, and thus ignores other constitutional interests. 56 An appeal to a higher-ordered principle, as a way of adjudicating between the competing interests at stake, is necessary if the law is
to provide a duty that each of us should obey, rather than becoming a
coercive impetus to action. At the second tier, courts may attempt to
determine what the law is according to what best fits the political morality of the society. 57 In reference to the second tier, I place Ronald
51. The scope of a right includes the cases that lie within its boundaries or its area of coverage.
The protection of a right is its strength, whether it prevails against opposing interests that may
also fall within its boundaries. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 131 (1982).
52. See supra notes 28, 31, 32, 33, 36, and infra note 98, and accompanying text.
53. See SAMAR supra note 46, at 76-77 (discussing criteria for when a judge should decide a
case based on conventional sources, when she should appeal to the society's political morality,
and when she should appeal to a system of natural law/natural rights).
54. See id. at 76, nn. 1 & 2.
55. See id. at 76-77, nn. 3 & 4.
56. See e.g. id. at 140-47 (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), as rendering too
narrow an interpretation of the constitutional right to privacy).
57. RONALD DWORKIN, A MAITER OF PRINCIPLE 143-44 (1985).
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Dworkin's approach of deciding what the law is by framing the question as one of choosing the best constructive interpretation of our legal practice. 58 However, even at this second tier, society's political
morality may not be clear, as was the case when the Court decided
Dred Scott v. Sanford.59 For this reason, a court may need to appeal to
a third tier of natural law/natural rights in order to decide a case
60
where society's morality is not fixed.
In Quill, the positive law was inconsistent insofar as New York allowed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, but did not allow
assisted suicide. As I will argue below, there may be no morally significant difference between the two approaches. The inconsistency of
New York's action in Quill is buttressed by the fact that under the
American Medical Association's (AMA) practice, a physician is allowed to provide terminal sedation to a patient in order to alleviate
pain while fully knowing that the medication will hasten death. 61 This
58. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986).

59. The Dred Scott case involved the question of whether the Constitution allowed Congress
to require northern states to return escaped slaves back to their southern masters under the
federal Fugitive Slave Act. The Court held that it did. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857). The decision is now considered to be effectively overruled by passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, specifically, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to
the Constitution.
60. See SAMAR supra note 46. In Dred Scott, the Court might have appealed to a third level of
natural law/natural rights to resolve the issue. Actually, given the widely held but divergent
viewpoints on the American Negro slave at the time of the Dred Scott decision, it is not clear
what result the Court might have reached had it chosen to follow that analysis. This demonstrates that even when one appeals to a higher-ordered political morality, social viewpoints may
still dominate. One may hope that at the higher levels, criteria might be provided by the theory
itself (such as what it means to be an agent) to help offset such biases. Nevertheless, in Dred
Scott, the Court disposed of the matter without such an appeal, making the case one of its most
notorious decisions.
Apparently, the Court felt that it could not leave the matter to the individual states because
that might lead to civil war. Nor was the Court's own solution to uphold the federal statute
justified in the minds of many commentators given that slavery would continue. If the Court
sought a solution at the third tier, it would have been concerned with what would be the best
overall theory of political morality to follow rather than how to best construct a legal practice
that had, up to this point, included slavery. The argument in favor of rejecting the second tier is
not that the best construction would include slavery, but that it might include majoritarian practices that would have delayed its removal.
Nevertheless, not following such a second tier approach would have meant taking a position in
favor of a potential civil war, which the Court was not prepared to do. The Court would have
had to figure out whose rights were legitimate and the scope of its obligation to protect those
rights. A higher-ordered principle might have provided this understanding. However, in Dred
Scott, the Court refused to take this higher road, which ironically only delayed the war that
perhaps was inevitable. See id. at 147-52 (citing Ronald Dworkin, "The Law of the StaveCatchco: A Review of Robert M. Clover's Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process."
TiMES LIT. SUPPL., December 5, 1975, at 1437).

61. See Quill, 521 U.S. at 809 (referring to Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 751).
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policy suggests that in Quill there was a need to go beyond the first
tier of analysis and determine whether the New York practice afforded equal protection under the law.
Two questions dominate at each tier. The first question is conceptual and asks how to characterize the issues in the case. Clearly, the
characterization of the issues often determines how a case will be decided, as was done in Glucksberg and Quill.62 In both Glucksberg and
Quill, the Supreme Court chose to characterize the basic issue as
whether the Constitution protects physician-assisted suicide, as opposed to whether it protects an individual's right to die. 63 Presumably,
the Court's choice in these cases was an effort to avoid making a decision that was broader than necessary to resolve the issues. When the
Court made its choice, the net effect was to invoke a set of constitutional norms that not only determined the outcome, but may have
repercussions in the future.
A second question asks what justifies a particular outcome in a case
as being correct. The answer to this question depends on how we
have resolved the normative question at the next highest level. An
outcome at one level is justified by appealing to a norm at the next
highest level thought to be justified. For example, a right to die may
be justified as an instance of either a more general due process right to
privacy or liberty, assuming that these values can provide a basis for
more particular rights. 64 The right to die could also be justified as an
aspect of equal protection of the laws if death is allowed in some situations but not others. 65 In this situation, equal protection would thus
be derivative of a prior due process determination: that a fundamental right was involved. However, not all agree. 66 For example, a general right to commit suicide would not be justified as an instance of
privacy or liberty if the state had a compelling interest to protect otherwise healthy individuals from momentary psychological impulses
that lead to their own deaths. 67 The question of what standards apply
may not arise if the prohibition against suicide is generally thought to
62. Id. at 812-13.
63. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06.
64. See SAMAR, supra note 19, at 196-203; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 793 (Stevens,
concurring).
65. I am relying on the idea that equal protection places a higher standard on a party's claim
when a fundamental right is involved. See TRIBE, supra note 29, at 1454.
66. See e.g., Cass K. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L. J. 1123, 1161 (1997).

67. It may be argued that I am assuming a compelling justification for restrictions on suicide
the Court never stated was required. Therefore, how do I reconcile that fact with the idea that
there are higher levels of abstraction? Moreover, even if it were the Court's view that laws
against suicide generally are supported by a compelling state interest, why, in the cases of physician-assisted suicide, did the Court fail to discuss the states' justifications in this way?
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subsume the issue in Glucksberg and Quill. In that situation, it may
simply be enough to suggest that the right to die is contrary to a longstanding tradition of our law prohibiting suicide or assisted suicide.
These two cases, along with Cruzan and In Re Quinlin,68 are the most
difficult types of cases for the courts because they fall between clear
instances of suicide and the broader rights to liberty and privacy.
Such cases push us in a direction toward re-evaluating issues not previously thought to be in question.
For any justification to succeed, there must be some higher norm
that is thought, at least tentatively, to be justified. 69 Nevertheless, that
higher normative principle may also be called into question. When
this occurs, the Court will face conceptual questions of what the principle means, what its scope and content is, and what norm justifies the
principle. 70 At each level of analysis, we may also find it necessary to
appeal to some principle of constitutional interpretation, which may
eventually take us to the point where what we appeal to is not part of
My answer has two parts. First, the fact that the Court assumed suicide in general to be
against our tradition says nothing as to whether that view was supported by a compelling state
interest or some lesser standard. The Court simply stated that even though "many of the rights
and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy [that] does not
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are
so protected .... Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. Thus, it is unclear if the Court thought that
suicide in general was outside the realm of privacy and liberty, or if it simply saw no reason to
reach that higher issue in these cases.
As for the second objection, the reason the Court did not characterize physician-assisted suicide as requiring a compelling state interest was because given the facial claims against the statutes that were before the Court. The Court did not see a factual basis to treat physician-assisted
suicide as any different from other forms of assisted suicide. Therefore, if restrictions on other
forms of assisted suicide were thought justified on the basis of whatever standard the Court
thought appropriate, physician-assisted suicide must be treated similarly.
In saying all this, I have adopted a kind of external viewpoint that presupposes that restrictions on suicide in general are justifiable as a compelling state interest, which are discussed infra.
Judges, speaking from an internal point of view, however, do not go this far. It is enough for
them that the issue of suicide in general can be prohibited and that physician-assisted suicide is
just another form of suicide. The fact that compelling state interest language was not used in
these cases should not appear all that surprising.
68. Cruzan, involved the question of whether parents and co-guardians could order the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from their twenty-five year old daughter after she sustained
severe injuries resulting in a loss of cognitive faculties and had no possibility of recovery. Treating the matter as involving a fundamental liberty interest rather than a general privacy right
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, under the lesser standard of protection that applies in due process cases, allowed the State of Missouri to continue life-sustaining treatment.
467 U.S. at 281-82. In In re Quinlan, 355 A. 2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976),
the patient's father sought a court order allowing him to disconnect a respirator so she could die
quickly. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted the father's request on the ground that the
individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily intrusion increases. Id. at 664.
69. See Delf Buchwald, Essay! Statutory Interpretation in the Focus of Legal Justification: An
Essay in Coherentist Hermenutics," 25 TOL. L. REV. 735. 744-50 (1994).
70. See id. at 750-51.
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the Constitution, but gives rise to its moral legitimacy. 7 1 Thus, each
stage of the analysis must rely on the norm adopted at the next highest
stage for its justification, until we reach a level where it is no longer
useful to raise a question, or until we have reached the highest level
where correspondence truth collapses into coherence truth. 72
If everything was clear, and no issue of justification was at stake,
there would be no need to appeal to higher levels. In Glucksberg and
Quill, this was not the case. The Court failed to give a full account for
why the right to die would not include physician-assisted suicide,
under what circumstances such assistance might be allowed, or even
73
whether a right to die existed.
Typically, the way we initially frame the conceptual question in a
case determines how far up the ladder of abstraction we go to solve
the normative question. Where a case appears to ask a fairly narrow
question, it is usually unnecessary for a court to appeal far up the
ladder of abstraction to decide the normative issue. This was the purported situation in Glucksberg and Quill. However, even in these scenarios the Court recognized that in a subsequent case, there may be a
very different set of facts. In such a situation, a court may begin with
the most concrete level where the decision can be rendered, and then,
if necessary to avoid inconsistency or injustice, move to more abstract
levels in order to resolve other issues that may arise. This proposition
relies on the assumption that we take our legal system to be morally
justified. 74 This analysis also relies on the assumption that courts are
most legitimate when they decide cases based on the narrowest interpretation of the law that the institutional practice makes available.
This internal point of view suggests that the Court's holding in
Glucksberg and Quill may have been motivated by its desire to protect its own legitimacy. In Glucksberg and Quill, the issue was not
whether a particular set of claimants had adequate pain relief to alleviate suffering available to them, or whether they had a specific rational reason to choose death, given the state of their current health. 75
Rather, the issue was whether the statute on its face was unconstitutional. 76 In this context, the decisions that the Court rendered may
71. See SAMAR, supra note 46, at 30-60.
72. See SAMAR, supra note 46, at 223.
73. Fred R. Farzino, Undue Economic Influence on Physician-Assisted Suicide, 1 DEPAUL

HEALTH CARE L. 537, 550-516 (1996) (giving particular emphasis to the failure to consider economic concerns).
74. See SAMAR, supra note 46, at 73.

75. This is made clear by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at
736-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 708-119: see Quill, 521 U.S. at 797-98.
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have been all that it felt politically able to accomplish in order to
avoid an appearance of overstepping efforts that were being made at
state legislative levels. In this sense, characterizing such cases as instances of suicide serves to prevent undeveloped ideological positions
from eclipsing the rational search for truth that courts should attempt
77
to perform.
In Glucksberg and Quill, the state laws in question did not deprive
terminally-ill patients of pain-relieving drugs that may hasten death,
or the patient's right to withdraw from life-sustaining treatment,
thereby allowing the narrower characterization to succeed.7 8 As indicated in the concurring opinions in Glucksberg and Quill, it was the
specific facts that persuaded several Justices to join in the result, on
the condition that the decisions be rendered at the lowest level of abstraction. 79 Since a facial challenge normally involves a higher level of
abstraction, the concurring Justices may have been concerned that if a
restriction was not placed on the holding, the precedent established by
the majority would be too restrictive on future cases. This concern is
typical of the Court's judicially conservative philosophy to not render
a decision that may be too broad under a different factual situation.
Note that conservative in this context is defined as not making a
broader decision than is necessary to decide the cases. In the concurring opinions, the ultimate result desired may have been more liberal
than the decisions that were actually rendered.
Conversely, if the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment was not
allowed, a decision to appeal to a higher-level principle might have
been forced. This fact is especially true if the patients were alive and
either in acute pain or drugged into a state of senselessness. In such
77. Elsewhere, I have called the decision to take carefully measured steps up the ladder of
abstraction "epistemic pragmatism," reflecting the view that courts are supposed to be engaged
in a search for knowledge but are at the same time limited in just how far they can go in that
search by their own need to maintain legitimacy along the way. I am not suggesting that my view
of the way courts operate is universally accepted. Critical legal studies theorists, for example,
see the operation of courts as often preserving the dominant political force in society. See RAYMOND) BELLIOTTI, JUSTIFYING LAW: THE DEBATE OVER FOUNDATIONS, GOALS AND METHODS

162 (1992). Critical race theorists see the function as supporting racial domination.

See, e.g.,

Derrick Bell, Radical Racism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 376 (1992). Some feminists see it as recreating gender divisions. See PATIRICIA WILLIAMS, Feminist Legal Critics: The Reluctant Radicals,
in RADICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO MAINSTREAM LEGAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 78 (David S. Caudill & Steven J. Gold eds. 1995); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 4-5 (1987). My argument here is
based solely on what I see as the only morally legitimate function for courts. See SAMAR, supra
note 46, at 110-37.
78. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736-37.
79. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 780 (Souter, J., concurring);
id. at 791 (Breyer, J.. concurring); id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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instances, the higher-level principle may have been the ground for a
more liberal result than that actually rendered in Glucksberg and
Quill.8 0
In all right to die cases, courts need to be circumspect when appealing to a higher-ordered principle in order to interpret equal protection, due process, or whatever constitutional provision might be
involved, if they are to avoid idiosyncratic decisions and preserve their
own legitimacy. In these physician-assisted suicide cases, the Court
seemed most aware of this requirement.8 1 The Justices went out of
their way to state that the level of abstraction chosen to resolve these
particular issues may be different from the level that may be utilized
82
in future cases with materially different facts.
IV.

WHY THESE HOLDINGS REMAIN OPEN

Next, this article discusses a possible rationale behind the precedential effect of Glucksberg and Quill in terms of why the Court believed
it was important to keep future decisions regarding the right to die
open. I do not intend to treat the issue politically in terms of the possible intentions of individual Justices. Rather, I intend to look at the
Court's decisions, including the various concurring opinions, as a rational unity that needs to be unpacked along the lines that I have already suggested. However, I also intend to go beyond mere appeals
into interpretative principles in order to show the underlying uncertainties that the Justices believed would have to be resolved before a
fuller decision could be rendered.
As indicated in the concurring opinions, and in footnote 24 of the
Court's majority opinion, the Justices acknowledged that they did not
intend to foreclose all future claims that may arise in right to die
cases.8 3 An example of such a situation is when the Court must rule
on the constitutionality of a statute that specifically recognizes a lim80. Bruce Ackerman's analysis of the Equal Protection Clause seems equally appropriate
here. He noted that history plays a role in equal protection analysis by bringing into relief the
deeper meanings behind the terms the Framers provided. As the specific context in which the
amendment was adopted recedes into the background, its own broad language comes into better
focus and thus, its provisions become more generalizable to new situations. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, I WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 94-99 (1991).
81. Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed the need to not preclude democratic debate on the issue. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735-36. Justice O'Connor spoke about these very [illegible] legal
barriers to [illegible] medication. Id. at 736-37. Justice Stevens emphasized the "categorical"
nature of the facial challenge. Id. at 741-42. Justice Souter expressed concern that the State's
claim could not be adequately confined. Id.
82. See id. at 735, n.24.
83. Id.; see also id. at 736-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 790-91 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(both emphasizing that the law before the Court did not require patients to be in severe pain).
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ited right to die.8 4 The Court did seem to believe, however, that the
fundamental autonomy interests of all people, as a matter of both constitutional and moral principle, can be more precisely defined by a set
of institutionally regulated policies. Such policies might be adopted as
legislative solutions to the problems of undue influence or coercion.
Moreover, if such a statute did not open a broader fundamental rights
objection, a principle of deference and not just autonomy may support
a decision to uphold the statute. However, such a decision would not
occur in a situation where a state tried to limit the use of pain-killers
and sedatives that hasten death. Since such a limitation can cause unnecessary pain and suffering to someone who will die anyway, the
intrusion on
Court might find the statute to impose an unwarranted
85
relationship.
doctor-patient
patient choice or the
As applied to either situation, the Glucksberg and Quill opinions
seem open to the possibility that there may be some legitimate scope
for a patient to claim a right to die. From a practical point of view, a
lawyer representing a client may want to look for such a fact pattern.
However, the analysis does not stop there. To state that an issue remains open does not indicate at this point how a different case might
be decided, let alone how it ought to be decided. Doctrine becomes
important and the Court's decisions in these cases might be seen as
mere instances of a broader constitutional/moral viewpoint.
Justice Stevens argued that the majority partially suggested a
method of looking at these decisions, while at the same time suggesting a deeper concern: a physician's ability to alleviate human suffering. His particular approach to the distinction between giving a
lethal injection and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment paral86
lels a long standing debate among moral philosophers.
In Euthanasia,Killing and Letting Die, James Rachels characterizes
the position of the AMA as one of permitting passive, although not
active, euthanasia. The AMA House of Delegates statement provides
as follows: "The intentional termination of the life of one human being by another-mercy killing-is contrary to that for which the medical profession stands and is contrary to the policy of the AMA."
84. Oregon has such a statute, which has been a hotbed of political debate at the national
level. Right to Die Hangs in the Balance with New Legislation; U.S. Government to Play God and
Decide Who Will Die and When, Bus. NEWS WIRE, November 4, 1999.
85. This seems to be Justice Breyer's point in saying that the Court need not decide now, if a
right to die "is fundamental under the Constitution." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 791 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
86. RACHELS, supra note 22, at 153-55. But see STEINBOCK, supra note 22, at 159-64. On the
question of causation, see the example cited in H. L. A. HARF & A. M. HONORP, CAUSATION IN
THE LAW 72 (1959).
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The policy also prevents involuntary passive euthanasia.
The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong
the life of the body when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent is the decision of the patient and/or his immediate family. The advice and judgment of the physician should
be
87
freely available to the patient and/or his immediate family.
According to Rachels, the flaw in the AMA's position is that it
"den[ies] that the cessation of treatment is the intentional termination
of life."' 88 When a doctor, following the provisions stated by the
AMA, determines that it is in her patient's best interests to discontinue treatment, decides not to perform a life-saving surgery, or instructs the nurses to withhold medication, she is intentionally
terminating the life of the patient with no significant moral difference
than if she actually gave the patient a lethal injection. 89 If there is a
significant moral difference, it is in favor of supporting the patient's
interests by avoiding further unnecessary suffering that would accompany a prolonged death caused by the cessation of treatment. As
Rachels notes, we would not allow the distinction between passive and
active taking of a life to exonerate or even lessen the moral culpability
of one who stood idly by watching a child drown in a bathtub, even
though the bystander did not force the child's head below the waterline. 9t If this proposition is true, one must then ask why in terminallyill cases we allow such a distinction to legally exonerate the medical
profession in terminating treatment, but not in giving a lethal injection. Either both forms of euthanasia are wrong, or they are not. As
a result, we must look at the justification for euthanasia itself.
In The Intentional Termination of Life, Bonnie Steinbock takes a
different view from Rachels with respect to the position of the AMA.
According to Steinbock, the AMA statement does not imply support
of the passive/active distinction because allowing "the cessation of the
employment of extraordinary means" to prolong life is not necessarily

87. Approved by the House of Delegates of the AMA on December 4, 1973 and cited in
supra note 22, at 152.
88. RACHELS, supra note 22, at 155.
89. Id.at 153-54. Cf Yale Kamisar in his most recent discussion of THE RiGT ro DiE, supra
note 43, at 516-17.
90. RACHELS, supra note 22, at 156. The notion that the two are morally different is based on
the idea that the person who holds the child's head under water is willing to act evilly, and
therefore, is more dangerous. While this concern may be a justification for greater punishment
as a way to deter such behavior, on its face it does not make the behavior any the more evil than
one who passively allows the child to die without offering the least assistance in a context where
there would be no comparable cost to the rescuer.
RACHELS,
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the same as intending to take that life.9 1 The difference is that the
right to refuse treatment can be viewed as protecting patient privacy
from unwanted intrusions by others; it is not to give patients the right
to die. 92 Moreover, "the point of discontinuing treatment is not to
bring about the patient's death but to avoid treatment that will cause
more discomfort than the [underlying illness] and has little hope of
benefiting the patient. '9 3 An analogous argument can be made for the
distinction between giving ordinary and extraordinary treatment
where the latter involves efforts to keep the patient alive, despite impending death. The distinction is too situational because it is based on
the physician's intent not to inflict pain without reasonable hope of a
cure or remission of the disease. 94 Once such treatment is withdrawn,
however, it will still not always be in the patient's best interest to receive a quick death as opposed to a death supported by the comfort
and love of her family and friends.
Obviously, both sides can muster arguments to support their positions. At the level of the proffered arguments, it is not clear that either one is mistaken. We have no way to ascertain exactly what is
mentally intended when euthanasia occurs. If it is true to say that one
intends the natural outcomes of one's actions, which in these cases is
death, then it is also true to say that death is intended when one believes they are alleviating pain and suffering by withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment. Thus, the debate continues without resolution
because the characterizations adopted by both sides evade, rather
than answer, the underlying issue of whether, and under what circumstances, a person has a right to die. 95 In short, the issue has no easy
answer.
Perhaps for this reason, the comments in several of the Justices'
opinions in Glucksberg, and footnote 24 of Quill, recognize the need
to keep the level of abstraction open so a future case may produce a
different result. 96 The reason these comments did not go further to91. STEINBOCK, supra note 86, at 160; see also Giles R. Scofield, Exposing Some Myths about
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 475, 478 (1995) (arguing that the two rights
are not the same).
92. See STEINBOCK, supra note 75, at 160.
93. Id. at 161-62.
94. See id. at 162.
95. The Court itself acknowledges that "Our holding permits this [national debate over the
right to die] to continue." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
96. Justice Stevens' point that a more particularized challenge in a future case might succeed
suggests that the Court will have to reassess the situation differently. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at
750 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Breyer's point that we need not now decide whether a right
to die is fundamental suggests a higher level of abstraction might be employed in the future. Id.
at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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ward recognizing a right to die at this time was because the Justices
believed that the facts of these two cases did not warrant such a recognition. 97 The Justices were also wary of making a constitutional ruling
broader than was needed to resolve the issue in each case. 98 Additionally, the Justices wanted to give deference to legislatures who are
in a position to set up task forces that can best determine ways to
protect physician ethics and ensure the avoidance of coercion and
stereotyping of the terminally ill. 99 Courts often avoid making constitutional pronouncements in areas where different facts in future cases
may suggest a different interpretation."" Courts are uncertain as to
the long-term solution and do not want to limit their options for the
future. 10 1 This may explain why in both Glucksberg and Quill, several
of the Justices wrote as if they preferred that the various states' legislatures first draft the statutes based on relevant fact-findings which a
court might later review. The Justices' concurring opinions certainly
suggested that further legislation in this area would not only be welcomed, but was an important part of the democratic process. 0 2 Reluctance to decide constitutional questions too quickly may also
explain why a communitarian approach often precedes a move to discussion regarding fundamental rights.
Nevertheless, there remains a difficulty with the Court's failure to
go further in its analysis of the right to die in Glucksberg and Quill.
That difficulty concerns a future court's directions as to how this area
of law should evolve. For this reason, we must go further than merely
explaining what the Court failed to do in each of these cases. We must
explain what the Court should do in a future set of cases. For example, we must illustrate under what circumstances the facts that may
have influenced Justice O'Connor to join the majority are not present.
However, this means that we must be prepared to present a consistent
theory of political morality regarding how such cases ought to be decided in the future. 0 3
97. As indicated, several of the Justices took note of the fact that no patient was being denied
pain medication even if it hastened death.
98. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion did not want to cut off debate. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 535. Justice Souter emphasized the legislature had not acted arbitrarily and had a superior
ability to obtain facts. Id. at 786-88 (Souter, J., concurring).

99. Id. at 788 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 737 (O'Connor, concurring).
100. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at xi-xiii.
11. This seems implied by several of the Justices' comments suggesting a possibly different
result in a more particularized case in the future.
102. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 788 (Souter, J., concurring).
103. I focus here on political morality because this is a fundamental rights question which has
not previously been well-defined or accepted.
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THEORETICAL CONCERNS

As a prologue to specifying a theory that would presumably provide
both scope and justification for a right to die, I shall address two questions. The first question asks what it means to have a right in general.
The second question concerns how rights are justified. This second
question is related to the level of abstraction a court may adopt to
discuss a topic. In the next section, I will specify how these levels of
abstraction are related specifically to the right to die. Initially, I treat
these two questions of meaning and justification separately because I
believe part of the difficulty in understanding the Court's recent position on the right to die is the tendency to conflate the analyses appropriate to these two distinct issues.
In most cases where there is substantial law addressed to a subject,
the resolution of these two issues will be readily apparent.10 4 In such
cases, stare decisis will usually govern. However, since the Glucksberg
and Quill holdings were the Supreme Court's first real attempt to address the right to die,10 5 precedent did not directly apply. Therefore,
the exact separation of these two issues, along with how that separation might affect future cases, is not readily apparent.
There is no case to tell us what the right to die means or how it is
justified. One reading of the Court's holdings in Glucksberg and Quill
suggests that there may be no right to die. If such a right did exist, the
Court could not decide that prohibiting a doctor from assisting in securing its application was constitutional. However, the language of
the various concurring opinions suggests the contrary; that the right to
die may exist and might be illustrated in other factual situations.
Again, how do we decide which of these two seemingly contradictory
interpretations is the correct one?
One opinion suggests that the right exists while another claims it
does not. Looking ahead to the next section, I believe attempting to
understand the logic of rights and how that logic is applied in court
cases will be quite helpful. There is probably something in the way
which courts only slowly unravel rights to decide cases that put us on
104. See SAMAR, supra note 46, at 118: see also Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1057, 1082-1087 (1975), No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1978).
105. I distinguish the present cases from Cruzan, where the Court decided the issue of
whether parents and a guardian had a right to seek withdrawal of a feeding tube from a patient
in a persistent vegetative state, not whether a lethal injection could be given. In Cruzan, the
Court treated the liberty issue as involving a lesser standard of protection associated with a due
process interest, rather than a fundamental right to privacy interest. As a result, while it was
willing to uphold some protection for a right to withdrawal a feeding tube provided it was in
keeping with what the patient would want, the Court was also willing to allow the states leeway
in deciding the standard of evidence to be used to make that determination. 467 U.S. at 281-82.
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the horns of this dilemma in the first place. However, this means understanding why courts feel it is necessary to make a narrower decision than might be made, for example, by a political philosopher.
In contrast to a court, a political philosopher seeks to justify the
legal system as a whole, even if the net effect of a decision may create
an overly broad interpretation of the law. Following the latter approach may be valuable if it means setting forth the conditions and
background moral doctrines that might persuade a future court to
adopt a different result to meet the needs of different factual
situations.
Regarding the first question of what it means to have a right, I note
that a right in the strict sense is a valid claim against some person or
group. The claim is valid if it is supported by some principle or reason
that cannot be morally discounted. 1 6 For example, if the principle is
that a person should do no harm, then a right not to be killed or physically or mentally assaulted would certainly fall under this principle. 10 7
The principle, in turn, is merely a particular value instance of a norm
that provides a ground for deciding a set of conceptually related ques106. See Alan Gewirth, The Basis and Content of Human Rights, 13 GA L. REV. 1143, 1147
(1979).
107. Here, I follow Alan Gewirth, who states that a right is a valid claim that fits the following
paradigm: A has a right to X against B by virtue of Y. See GEWIRTH, supra note 50. In this
paradigm, A is the subject of the right, X is the object, B is the respondent, and Y is the reason or
justification for the right. Id. As indicated, Y will always be a principle that justifies the right. In
addition to the above elements, one might specify the institutional setting-law, ethics, etiquette-in which the right occurs as well as the nature of the right involved. The latter goes to
what we mean when we use the term "right" since not all uses are the same. For instance, if the
use is meant to invoke a claim right, such as a contract right or a right not to be harmed, then
there will be a correlative duty falling either on a single individual or on the general public
depending on the particularity of the transaction that brings it about. WESLEY N. HOHFELO,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEI-rlONS 36 (1946). If the duty is personal-in persona-the transaction will be specific, as the making of a contract to which each party will have a duty only to
the other. If the duty is general-in rem-the transaction will be universal as in the areas of tort
and criminal law where we have decided that each person has a duty to everyone else in society.
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, (2nd ed. Robert Audi ed., 1995). If the use is meant to
invoke a liberty, such as the right to pick up ten dollars lying in the gutter, then no correlative
duty exists. id. No one is obligated to assist another in retrieving the ten dollars nor to refrain
from picking it up themselves. If the use is to refer to a power, such as Congress' power to make
laws, then all who are in the United States are liable to obey those laws. It is important to
remember that some have thought that the justification for Congress, or any legislature, having
such a power may arise from either an explicit agreement, as was true when the Federal Constitution was adopted, or by way of an implied social contract created by residing within the territory. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE or GOVERNMENT nos. 95, 119 (C. B. Macpherson ed.
Hackett 1980). Finally, if the use is meant to invoke an immunity, such as the Fifth Amendment's immunity against governmental incrimination, then the states are prohibited from forcing
one to sign a confession. Id. As my concern in this essay is with the right to die as both a claim
right and a liberty, I will restrict myself to just these forms.

2000]

IS THE RIGHT TO DIE DEAD

tions involving how one ought to act.' 0 8 The norm might concern liberty, privacy, justice, or basic well-being. From an internal point of
view, the perspective of the person who takes the legal system to be
just, the norm will be a standard, model, or pattern adopted by the
society to answer these questions of value. Whatever the norm, the
question of whether it needs a more exacting justification will depend
on whether the values it is taken to support are themselves in question. If the values are in question, the controversy may be resolved by
proposing an idealized choice situation in which all the parties can
agree to at least a tentative resolution of what the norm encompasses,
as suggested in the writings of John Rawls. 1 9 The norm could also be
justified as being derived from a universal principle that all persons
qua agents must rationally accept on pain of contradiction, as argued
by Alan Gewirth." l0 However the norm is justified, its value to the
affected person or group will be determined, at least in part, by the
end to which it is directed.I'
The end may be valued by the group for a limited concrete or abstract reason.112 Here, too, our second concern regarding justification
is applicable. If the reason is concrete, it is directed toward fulfilling
the immediate purpose of the person or group which may be a moral
or immoral end. 13 If the reason is abstract, it might promote a broad
14
social value such as liberty or autonomy, but it also might not.'
Rights based on promise keeping provide good examples of ends that
108. SAMAR, supra note 14, at 83.

109. See
&

JOHN RAWLS,

A

THEORY OF JUSTICE,

118-92 (1971). See also
(1986).

DERYCK BEYLEVELD

ROGER BROWNSWORD, LAW AS A MORAL JIUI)GMENT

110. See GEWIRTH, supra note 50, at 41-78.
111. See SAMAR, supra note 14, at 83. The point here is to suggest a connection between
strictly deontological and teleological approaches to our recognition of rights. Under strictly
deontological approaches, rights are justified by their pedigree. Under teleological approaches,
they must serve some important end. Both approaches are too limited to provide an adequate
justification for rights. Deontological approaches tend toward too abstract a notion of rights to
protect human well-being. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
179-83 (1982). Teleological approaches are too contingent and, even when they are not, as with
Aristotle's notion of happiness, they do not provide the certainty that one hopes human rights
provide. Immanuel Kant's criticism, although not framed in rights language, of hypothetical
imperatives, even those that appear to have a universal end, is applicable. See IMMANUEL KANT,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31-34 (Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill

1959).
112. SAMAR, supra note 14, at 83. Norms will often involve both teleological and deontological components. The teleological component concerns the goals to be reached as well as the
goods to be obtained. The deontological component concerns questions of justice and fairness,
and consent. Justice, for example, illustrates the deontological side while concern for the common good exhibits the teleological side.
113. See SAMAR, supra note 14, at 83. 1 mean to distinguish here self-interest as a basis for
rights from a more general moral view.
114. Id.
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are both particular and general."I5 The end is general in the sense that
it promotes the generally accepted value that, all else being equal, giving one's word to another is the same as binding oneself. The end is
particular in the sense that one is now bound to the other for a specific
purpose.' 16 However, an obvious vagary arises when I say "all else
being equal" because there may be conditions where the duty to complete one's promise is voided on moral grounds." 7 The end thus
would also have to be moral for the promise to command our obedience. 118 Being abstract only guarantees that the end is general with
respect to an individual's or group's self-interest, not that it promotes
some important aspect of human welfare.
In the law, the ends will be abstract in the sense of being general,
but will not always be perceived at the same level of generality. This
idea is made evident by the fact that a law which appears questionable
at one level of analysis may be morally acceptable at a more abstract
level and vice versa. For example, a constitutional interpretation that
allows Nazis to march in a community of holocaust survivors may
seem immoral, until it is recognized that the very existence of such
freedoms in part ensures that human rights are being protected. (This
is independent of an evaluation that it is wrong for people to use their
rights in this way.) Similarly, a law that supports private transactions,
as in the area of contracts, may be justified by principles that fulfill
some important social end, such as the promotion of a free market
economy, provided that no moral law is violated. However, at even a
higher level of abstraction, it might be recognized that some laws
which might accomplish this policy or practical purpose would also be
immoral. 119 For example, laws that would allow people to contract
away their basic rights to freedom and well-being for food and shelter
would be immoral. More to the point, a society that does not afford
115. For a good discussion of the difference between particular and general rights, see H. L.
A. HART, Are There Any Natural Rights? in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 53-66 (Anthony Quinton
ed. 1967).

116. See generally JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTs 294-321 (1990),
117. Under such conditions, fulfilling one's promise may violate a more important moral end
and thus performing the act may even be immoral. A doctor passing by a serious accident when
no other medical help is available in order to be on time to a promised dinner engagement is just

one such example.
118. This is an instance of what I earlier explained as the adjectival versus nominative uses of
the word "right." We may allow as justified the nominative use of a right in the general case
even though the end to which it is put in the particular case we judge to be morally wrong.
119. In JUSTIFYING JUDGMENT, I argue that the fundamental mistake with the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), was that in upholding freedom of contract, the
Court failed to do justice. See

SAMAR,

supra note 46, at 162-71.
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alternatives to those persons who find it financially necessary to contract away their rights would be a morally destitute society.
It is also important to distinguish ends that are directly connected to
moral rights from those ends that may be connected to policies and
practices that sometimes create moral duties. The goals of society, as
expressed by its policies or practices, even if moral, do not necessarily
create moral rights. For one reason, such policies and practices may
not be "personally oriented;" that is, they may not be "requirements
owed to distinct subjects or individuals as such for the good of those
individuals." 120 Moreover, policies and practices can be morally ambiguous in a way that rights cannot. With respect to rights, a holder of
a right has a prima facie moral claim until a higher moral principle is
found to override that claim. In the case of a policy or practice, as the
above free market illustration indicates, one needs a separate moral
argument to justify placing an obligation on an individual to support
some collective or societal goal. Thus, even the goal to sustain life,
when construed as a policy, does not create a moral right unless the
goal is brought under a principle that all persons qua persons could
theoretically agree on and would subsequently possess.' 2' Such a principle is required because social goals, even laudatory ones, do not
guarantee that the morally legitimate interests of all persons are being
given equal concern. 122 Thus, policies and practices only create moral
rights when attached to principles like fairness, consent (as in majority
rule), justice, or other principles that protect the freedom and wellbeing of all people. 23 Even then, the violation of a social goal may not
necessarily entail a moral wrong. This condition depends upon the
harm done to individuals that would likely result from such a violation. Moral duties correlating to moral rights, require that the policies
and practices to which they may attach be fair in their treatment of
different people; thus, the formal side of morality is represented.
However, these same duties and rights must also be significant in promoting the fundamental interests of all people as such, the material

120. GEWIRTH, supra note 50, at 11.
121. See Onora O'Neill, Reason and Politics in the Kantian Enterprise,in KANT'S POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 73-74 (Howard Williams ed., 1992).

122. Ronald Dworkin distinguishes policies from principles. The former reflect goals to be
reached like "an improvement in some economic, political or social feature of the community."
Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 23 (1967). The latter reflect "a
requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality." Id.
123. Here I note that morality addresses the "the most important interests, of persons or
recipients other than or in addition to the agent or the speaker." ALAN GEWIRrH, REASON AND
MORALITY 1 (1978).
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side. 12 4 In those cases where little or no harm is likely to result from
violating a policy or practice, only a minor moral infraction exists.
From what has been said, it should now be evident that the claimed
right to physician-assisted suicide must be supported by moral principles which courts are obligated to recognize, if it is to be upheld on
constitutional grounds. This is the second theoretical question I set
out to discuss and the one which the various concurring opinions
largely ignored. However, the analysis goes beyond even this question. Courts of law are not in the business of recognizing principles in
a random fashion, even moral principles. The case may also be made
for opting not to set forth too broad a decision where necessary information is lacking.
Additionally, principles which the courts do adopt should be related
to some important end that courts are obligated to secure, and that
end must also be a moral end if it is to correlate to a duty that others
ought to obey. 2 5 For example, in physician-assisted suicide cases, the
end might be to respect individual autonomy. Courts should recognize this end as essential in itself, and as foundational to achieving a
democratic society. 126 Otherwise, we are in the position of a gunman
who can issue an order without that order providing more than a self127
interested motivation for obedience.
The government's role in recognizing moral principles should be restricted to those circumstances when rights cannot be adequately protected by the individuals who hold these rights. This scenario is likely
in cases which involve the right to die. Such a limitation extends from
a prudential principle that has moral consequences. That idea is to
avoid the creation of an overbearing government that could use its
power to restrict rights and privileges. 128 Still, what constitutional
124. See APPLYING MORAL THEORIES 10 (3d ed. C. E. Harris Jr. ed. 1997). H. L. A. Hart also
makes use of the distinction between the formal and material sides of morality when he discusses
a society that determines who is free and who are slaves according to a formal principle of
justice, such as, by treating like cases alike. Here, the problem can be seen in our own history
when, for example, many African-Americans were treated as slaves. The theoretical concern
that Hart is drawing to our attention is that the criterion we use to determine whether two cases
are alike or do not matter. See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 624 (1958).
125. See SAMAR, supra note 46, at 30-60.

126. For the argument that autonomy is an end of a democratic society, see

SAMAR,

supra

note 14, at 88-103; for the argument that it is a value in itself by virtue of being a source for other
values, see id. at 205-07; see also GEWIRTH, supra note 123, at 256, and CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 19-20 (1996).

127. Here, I follow the distinction H. L. A. Hart makes between being obliged and having an
obligation. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 80 (2nd ed. 1994).

128. Gewirth, for example, notes that government may be necessary to adequately protect
human rights. But such government must provide both consent for its decision procedures as
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principle might justify a right to die? How might we reach such principles? These are the important and complex questions which I shall
address in the next part.

VI.

THE

SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLE BEHIND THE RIGHT TO DIE

In Glucksberg and Quill, the Court's doctrinal approach to the right
to die was limited in scope. As a result, we must provide criteria for
how the Court's approach might be broadened if future cases that
challenge the current limitations arise.
If the decision in any new case is to be sound, it cannot simply be
based on the whims of the Court. However, the decision also cannot
be based on a mere recitation of past or current statutes. Legislative
history governing a statute can be important because various legislative committees, as well as the intentions of those involved in crafting
the legislation, can be useful in aiding the manner in which a statute
129
should be interpreted.
Nevertheless, in future cases, the Court may have to consider the
issue at a higher level of abstraction if the cases pose fundamentally
new or serious challenges to basic liberty. More likely than not, such
issues will attract attention that is not as easily avoidable as it was in
Glucksberg and Quill. This suggests that a court preparing to engage
future cases cannot restrict itself to specific legislative decrees or random political and moral views. The political morality underlying any
such attempt would, no doubt, be in question. Additionally, it is not
enough to say, under such trying circumstances, that we must wait for
a legislative enactment to decide such cases. The enactment may not
be forthcoming. Furthermore, the enactment may be unreasonable,
unjust, overinclusive, or underinclusive. The person whose interests
are at stake may be too weak or powerless to forge the political might
necessary to affect a change in the law. In all such situations, the
courts will be pushed to a higher-ordered framework while deciding
the matter at hand. Thus, tentative guidelines enabling a court to
130
make such a move must be in place.
well as substantive protections to protect rights in the long run. See GEWiRTH, supra note 50, at
59-66.
129. For a recent debate on the value of such legislative histories, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MAI-ER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29-36 (1997).
130. Here it is important to note a distinction without a difference that Kamisar seems to rely
on, in his most recent discussion of the right to die, when he states: "As for drawing lines where
they should not be drawn, this author submits that if a court believes respect for 'self-determination' and 'personal autonomy' entitles a competent person to decide when and how she chooses
to end her life, that 'right' or 'liberty' should not be (and will not be) limited to the 'terminally
ill."' KAMISAR, supra note 43, at 489-90. The quote seems related to what he later adds: "[l]f
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These guidelines are essential if the law is to be part of a governing
morality that provides for a broad social duty of obedience, including
a judicial duty to follow law, and protection for fundamental human
rights. Right to die cases require our constitutional jurisprudence to
invoke meta-principles capable of selecting the appropriate level of
abstraction necessary to render a moral decision. If the society's political morality in this area is uncertain (Glucksberg and Quill were, after all, rather narrow decisions), then it may be necessary for a court
to appeal beyond social morality to a theory of natural law/natural
rights to reach a decision. This occurrence will also mean that it will
be necessary for the court to very carefully choose which theory of
natural law/natural rights to adopt if its own legitimacy is not to be
called into question. Thus, it will be particularly important for the
court to present the view that it adopts in such a way as to enhance its
own legitimacy by showing how the protections it secures would in31
clude other fundamental rights that people are thought to share.
Since the Court in Glucksberg and Quill left the ultimate questions
open, it may be helpful to its own future decisions, as well as to other
courts and legislatures who will be called upon to consider similar
questions, to now take up the broader issues of doctrine that might
arise in these cases. In order to conduct such an analysis, however, I
will need to follow an approach opposite to the one usually followed
by the judiciary. Rather than moving from the specific to the general
by graduated pragmatic steps, I will begin at the highest level of relevant abstraction and move down by a process of deduction in order to
suggest what factual distinctions may be important for future courts to
autonomy is crucial, the requirement of unbearable suffering would appear to be entirely subjective. Who is to say-other than the patient herself-how much suffering is too much?" Id. at
506. But this is a misuse of Wittgenstein's notion of a private language game. The fact is that we
do make such statements and understand them all the time as any parent (or friend) knows who
has told their child (friend), "look, you will get over it." The point is that "meaning is relational
because it is a normative notion: to say X means Y is to say that one ought to take X for Y; and
this requires a legislator to determine that one must take X for Y, and a citizen to obey. And the
relations between these two is not merely causal because the citizen can disobey: there must be
the possibility of misunderstanding or mistake." KORSGAARD, supra note 126, at 137-38. With
my example, the person who determines that they cannot bear the pain any longer is subject to
being told by their parent or friend that they can; perhaps, that other person has been in a
similar situation. Thus, the idea that one cannot understand the language of another's suffering,
even though there is no direct access to the suffering as such, is simply wrong. We do it all the
time, and it is probably part of the universality of our psychology that we can.
131. 1 take it that most people in a democratic society would, at least, expect their political
institutions to afford the maximum possible amount of freedom and well-being equally to all
people. Even if a person were a die-hard libertarian, she could agree that this is an end of
democratic institutions since such institutions, unlike the private sector, should not themselves
discriminate among peoples.
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consider. In short, I will be taking the road of the political philosopher, who asks how the legal system is justified, rather than the legal
philosopher, who is more concerned with how law becomes justified.
Most future cases in this area do not need to approach the highest
level of political morality since most cases could be decided on privacy
grounds, if privacy is considered to be a part of autonomy. 13 2 This
idea is true because a mere description of the act of ending one's life
does not in and of itself suggest a conflict with anyone else's interest.1 33 Nevertheless, at this point I will take the higher approach of the
political philosopher to illustrate how, notwithstanding current disputes about privacy, Glucksberg and Quill could be made consistent
with a very different set of results in future cases.' 34 This analysis reinforces the idea that even if current privacy law is in flux, right to die
cases may establish the connection between the current law of privacy,
and society's commitment to preserving autonomy as a value. Again,
my point is not to suggest that courts should actually proceed in such a
manner. This approach may open too many theoretical questions,
such as the objectivity of a moral position, which most courts are not
prepared to answer. Rather, my point is simply to set forth a coherent
political morality that may provide the necessary background rights
that a future court will be able to rely upon in order to engage and
decide cases in this area. With this in mind, consider the following
theory derived from the concept of agency as a possible candidate for
this highest level of political morality.
132. See SAMAR, supra note 14, at 196-203; see also Jonathan R. MacBride, Comment, A
Death Without Dignity: How the Lower Courts Have Refused to Recognize that the Right of Privacy and the Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest Protect an Individual's Choice of PhysicianAssisted Suicide, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 755, 771-76 (1995); but cf Edward A. Lyon, Comment, The
Right to Die: An Exercise of Informed Consent, Not an Extension of the Constitutional Right to
Privacy, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1367 (1990) (arguing that the right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment is not protected by the constitutional right to privacy).
133. The point here is that "[a]n action is self-regarding (private) with respect to a group of
other actors if and only if the consequences of the act impinge in the first instance on the basic
interest of the actor and not on the specified class of actors." SAMAR, supra note 14, at 68. Thus,
private acts are relational, but not relative, assuming we are able to unravel a priori two distinct
ideas that make up the definition. The first is what we mean by "in the first instance." Here, it is
simply that the mere description of the act "without the inclusion of any additional facts or
causal theories" suggests a conflict. Id. at 65. The second is what we mean by a "basic interest."
Basic interests "are independent of conceptions about facts and social conventions." Id. The
point of these two further definitions is not to say privacy will never conflict with some important
social interest or some other right. As will be argued infra, that would occur if the justification
for the right also justified the other right or interest. Presumably, the conflict would be resolved
by asking whether the other right or interest better promoted, or protected, autonomy in general. For now, it is enough simply to make plausible when a claim to privacy exists.
134. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court relied on the liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause rather than the right to privacy. 467 U.S. at 261.
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Agency is a useful starting point for this analysis for the same reasons that Gewirth suggests it applies to moral theory. 35 Any theory
of political morality, including any theory of law that seeks to import a
duty to obey law, must presuppose that the people it is addressing are
voluntary purposive agents if it is to be able to prescribe prescriptive
oughts. 36 This statement is as true in law as it is in morality because
the concept of action is central to any legal enterprise.137 Thus, following Kant's famous dictum, "ought implies can," if one cannot perform
some act, one ought not to be obliged to do so.' 38 Accordingly, voluntarism and purposivism, which necessarily invoke concerns for freedom and well-being, are essential ingredients to the existence of a
duty to obey law. 139 It is also appropriate to restrict what we mean by
"rationality" to the canons of deductive and inductive logic. 140 This
restriction is necessary to avoid the backdoor entry of unnecessary
biases from creeping into the analysis as might come about, for example, when rationality is thought of as cost/benefit analysis. In such a
case, concerns about costs, when allocated among enough people,
might out step important rights that only few will claim.
Taking agency as our first principle, we begin by making several
factual distinctions which were not relevant to the recent Court decisions, but are likely to become important in future cases. The first
distinction concerns the difference between being in a persistent vegetative state and being in a temporary coma. The second distinction
concerns being in a conscious terminally-ill state, especially one of excruciating pain and suffering, versus being in a coma. The third distinction concerns not being either terminally-ill or in a persistent
vegetative state, but still not wanting to live. With regard to the latter,
135. In Reason and Morality, Gewirth takes agency as the starting point because voluntariness
and purposiveness are the basic aspects of human action that all moral theories must presuppose.
GEWIRTH, supra note 123, at 26-27. The same is true for legal theory. BEYLERELD, supra note
109, at 33.

136. GEWIRTH, supra note 123, at 26-27.
137. Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword have noted that a legal enterprise and knowledge of it involves human action, and that it is the same concept of human action that is involved
in all moral reasoning. Consequently, if the concept of human action can be shown to commit an
agent to accept a supreme principle of morality, that same principle will apply when human
conduct is brought within the fold of the legal enterprise. However, this means that legal phenomena can be properly judged in terms of this moral principle. See BEYLEVELD, supra note
109, at 161-62.
138. Id. at 68; see IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A5481B576 (1787).
139. See William Rehg, Introduction in Jiirgen Habermas, BETWEEN
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY BETWEEN

1996).
140.

GEWIRTH,

supra note 123, at 22.
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I assume there is some substantial pain and suffering as a reason for
wanting to die.
The above distinctions are important because they bring out an otherwise hidden aspect of saying that the right to die is a fundamental
right. Such an aspect arises because of a confusion in the word "fundamental." The confusion manifests itself when issues of both the
coverage of the right (what actions the right subsumes) become conflated with its protection (i.e., the strength of the right when compared
against other rights or state interests with which it may conflict). If
the right to die were treated as the final moral arbitrator in each of
these disputes, then all three of the above situations would fall not
only under its umbrella, but each would be decided in the same way
since there is not an instance where we have reason to believe that the
right's protection is limited.
Glucksberg and Quill would be wrongly decided merely because
they dared to allow an exception. As with abortion, neither the states
nor the federal government may unnecessarily burden the patient's
choice with regulations. 141 In the case of abortion, the burden is directed toward the mother's choice., prior to the unborn's viability. If it
were necessary for the courts to extend the coverage of the right to
consensual physician-assisted suicide in order to protect the effectiveness and practicality of the right to die, that should also occur.
We could not limit the scope of the patient's right to die in any of
these instances by saying simply that in some cases it does not apply.
Additionally, we could not say that even if a case fell under the coverage of the right its protection would be offset by a compelling state
interest.' 42 Such a statement would involve justification that presumably would not be arbitrary, but nevertheless impedes the apparent
fundamental character of the right to die. Consequently, we must be
careful to state exactly what we mean when we say that the right to
die is fundamental.
The right to die cannot be an expression of the highest standard for
determining what a person is constitutionally allowed to do if the
ground for the right is to be based on a principle that might allow for
exceptions. In right to die cases, both the protections of liberty and
well-being may play dual but sometimes opposite roles. This idea suggests the possibility of different outcomes depending on how these
two justificatory factors balance each other out in a particular factual
context. Of course, we want consistency over a whole range of mor141. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
142. For a discussion of the role the coverage/protection distinction plays in fundamental
rights cases, see, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 51, at 131.
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ally similar situations. For these reasons, the right to die must be justified by a middle-level principle governing a range of cases, but one
that may itself be subject to a still higher moral standard. 4 3 It is in this
sense that I claim that the right to die might be thought of as governed
by, and consequently less fundamental than, the right to privacy of
which it is a part. Moreover, the latter may be less fundamental than
a still higher-ordered principle of autonomy which preserves voluntary purposive action. 44 To allow otherwise would offset, without justification, any interest a state might have, for example, in the
preservation of life. Such a position is hard to contemplate.
The right to die is certainly based on principles that in themselves
are arranged in successively higher orders. This is enough to resolve
conflicts with other values which the state has a compelling interest in
promoting. In order to discover what these other values are, however,
we need to know two things. First, what is the scope of the right to die,
that is, what types of cases does it encompass? Second, what is its
degree of protection when compared to other rights or interests the
state may have a compelling reason for protecting? As will be seen
below, the latter is related to how the right to die is justified in terms
of a succession of higher-ordered principles from an external point of
view.
With respect to the first of these two issues, the right to die can be
seen to encompass two distinct case situations. The first concerns the
case wherein the entity that will be assisted or left to die is not a person in the relevant sense. The second concerns a person who has
made a decision to terminate his own life. In the second case, we must
distinguish between choosing how to die, where one has a fatal disease, and choosing to die where no such disease exists. While both
situations involve when one dies rather than if one dies, they are dis143. In the moral arena, a related doctrine applies. Moral evaluations are often divided between moral judgments about what to do in a particular situation, moral principles about how
certain types of decisions should be handled, and the moral standard which is the supreme overriding principle that justifies all other moral principles. See APPLYING MORAL THEORIES supra

note 97, at 56-63. While the three levels of analysis go from the most concrete to the most
general, the justification for a decision at each level proceeds in the opposite fashion. This reflects the dual nature of moral reasoning: that it proceeds from practical questions to theoretical
ones, although ultimately it must justify any practical decisions on the basis of theoretical determinations. The same is true of law.
144. Here, privacy involves only interests which by definition do not effect others. In right to
die cases, the interests of others may also not be directly involved. But insofar as the self-seeking freedom has an opposite interest to the self-choosing well-being, a conflict between these two
justificatory components of the same right to die exists within the self. In this sense, the right to
die is less closely a pure liberty right than the right to privacy of which it is a part since the self's
well-being is also involved. See SAMAR, supra note 14, for a more general discussion of the right
to privacy.
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tinguishable by the type of loss to agency that will occur if the death
comes about earlier than would otherwise have been the case. At this
point, the second issue of the right's protection also becomes relevant
because there presumably may be other important interests at stake
where death is chosen though life could still be maintained. I will deal
with each of these issues in turn.
In determining whether the entity that will be aided or left to die is
a person, the central question is not whether it is alive but whether it
is an agent. This follows what all moral theories have in common.
45
Each theory addresses the behavior of voluntary purposive beings.'
Possessing voluntariness and purposiveness are essential ingredients
both to being the bearer of a right's claim or the respondent to someone else's rights. 146 The idea is not that trees, for example, do not have
rights, but they cannot be bearers of their own claims or the respondents to others claims against them. 147 Essentially, the point is that
being an agent is a priori to having moral rights. 148 Still, it may be
argued that the issue for determination should be the existence of life
149
and not agency.
The analytical problem with making life the determining factor is
that it is not exactly clear what is to be protected. Are we to protect
any and all biological life? If this is the case we must conclude prima
facie that not only is the law that allows abortion wrong, but so are all
of our other laws that allow for the withdrawal of life-sustaining support or the taking of lives, including through the use of the death penalty. 150 If it is specifically human life that is to be protected, the next
logical question is what do we mean by human? Are we talking about
having a certain number of chromosomes, and if so, why should that
matter? If the issue is one of a religious matter, such as having a soul,
how do we prove humans have souls? This is, of course, setting aside
the fact that it would be difficult to justify using religion as a basis for
145. See GEWiRTH, supra note 123, at 26-27.
146. Animals with pain-receptors have a right to be free from wanton infliction of pain. But
this is a minimal right based on the fact that animals approach agency (although they are not
agents) by their capacity to experience the debilitating effects of pain. See id. at 144.
147. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (J. Douglas, dissenting) (arguing that
inanimate objects should have standing when they are about to be despoiled).
148. Not all moral theories make this claim or may even recognize this claim. But I would
assert that any moral theory must presume that those it addresses are voluntary purposive
agents. This follows from Kant's dictum of "ought implies can." Otherwise, the theory would
simply not be a moral theory.
149. For example, the Thomist position, followed by conservative philosophers in the Roman
Catholic church, treats life as a more basic value. See Si. THOMAS AQUINAS, Concerning the
Nature of Law, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAs 750 (A. Pegis ed. 1945).

150. See Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. R, v. or BOOKS, June 29, 1989, at 50.
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decisions in a pluralistic society that subscribes to a doctrine of separation of church and state. If the matter concerns being sentient, feeling
pain or having emotions, then certainly animals have some of these
traits, and thus, morality requires that they not be caused unnecessary
pain. Does this idea also require that animals not be killed for food,
for example?' 5' If the concern is that humans have a unique set of
experiences in the sense of having a unity of consciousness, then the
question arises, what is it about having consciousness that provides
one rights? 152 A pluralistic society might recognize nonagents as having rights, but the question which follows is what is the foundation for
these rights?
Each of these questions assists in demonstrating that a common
ground for connecting certain entities to the notion of having moral
rights, even in a pluralistic society where different views are present, is
at least the concept of human agency. 53 Therefore, human agency
should be our starting point since all moral theories, no matter what
else their contents may be, must presuppose the concept.' 54 Any
other condition that might be brought into such an enterprise, unless
it could be shown to be equally a priori in the sense I described above,
is likely to be far more controversial and uncertain, especially in a
diverse pluralistic society, than human agency. Since human agency
alone is necessarily presupposed by every moral theory, any other
condition could easily restrict who has rights to less than all human
agents in ways that appear to be morally unjustifiable. 155 Based on
this knowledge, voluntarism and purposivism must be at the heart of
any principle supporting what courts should do in deciding cases that
56
involve fundamental rights.'
151. The area of animal rights is quite controversial. For an argument in favor of animal
rights see Peter Singer, All Animals Are Equal in Animal Liberation, N.Y. REV. 1-22 (1975); but
see R. D. Guthrie, Anthropocentrism in The Ethical Relationship Between Humans and Other
Organisms, 2 PERSI'PECrIVES IN BIOLOGY AND MEDiCINE (1997-1998).

152. See SAMAR, supra note 14, at 172.
153. See GEWIRTH, supra note 50, at 46.
154. See GEWIRTH, supra note 123, at 26-27.

155. Gewirth shows that acting contrary to the basic moral principle derived from agency,
namely, the Principle of Generic Consistency, forces the actor into contradicting him or herself.
For this reason, it cannot be morally justified. See GEWIRTH, supra note 123, at 327-28.
156. Voluntarism and purposiveness are not themselves the moral standard but rather the
moral standard is elements. From these two elements a moral standard might be derived which
would have applicability to fundamental rights issues. For this article, I have avoided Gewirth's
formal proof of his Principle of Generic Consistency as the moral standard to avoid further
complication to an already difficult area. For a fuller account of Gewirth's discussion including
the derivation of his supreme principle of morality see GEWIRrH, supra note 123, at 3. That
principle states: "Act in accord with the generic rights [i.e.,
the rights to freedom and well-being]
of your recipients as well as yourself." Id. at 135. Though I have not made specific reference to
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Given that agency, in the sense of voluntary purposive behavior, is a
basis for determining the scope of all rights, including the right to die,
we can answer the first question of who is a person by analytically
setting forth the criteria of when someone is an agent. An analytical
approach works here because the question is about what we mean by
a person. Moreover, the criteria we are going to rely upon to answer
the question of voluntariness and purposiveness must be central to
any moral theory. Thus, an agent is one who can act voluntarily for
one's own purposes.
At this point, I follow Gewirth in stating that by "voluntarily," I
mean that the agent acts by his own unforced choice. In stating purposes, I refer to the goals that the agent has a pro-attitude toward
securing, whether or not those goals may also be moral.' 5 7 Accordingly, every normal adult is an agent. Insofar as he or she is not suffering a debilitating cognitive function, the person is capable of acting
voluntarily, at least mentally, for purposes they believe to be good.
What about persons who are asleep or in a temporary coma? Such
persons are prospective agents in that all the necessary capacities for
full-fledged agency are present, even though at the moment they may
be prevented from exercising these capacities. In contrast, persons in
a persistent vegetative state, as well as the unborn, are not agents (actual or prospective). At most, the latter may be potential agents be158
cause the capacities do not yet exist to being full-fledged agents.
In this respect, one sees an analogy to the way one might speak of
their automobile. At the time one places an order for a new automobile, the plant may not yet have the vehicle in stock but only the raw
materials to make the car. At this stage, one might say that the plant
has a certain potential, based on available resources, to fill orders for
some number of automobiles. On the other hand, one who has an
automobile that is not running-maybe it needs gas, spark plugs, a
new accelerator, etc.-still owns a prospective automobile because all
the essential mechanisms are in place for the automobile to run. The
automobile simply needs "ordinary" supports that any owner would
expect to provide by virtue of owning an automobile. The situation is
completely changed when one speaks of an automobile that has been
totaled other than in the insurance sense of the term.1 59 In that case,
the principle in this text, it should be understood that my discussion of the moral standard is in
terms of that principle.
157. Id. at 27.
158. The unborn are not agents because they cannot act by their own unforced choice with
knowledge of relevant circumstances. Especially at an early stage of a pregnancy, even the idea
that they could is not plausible. See SAMAR, supra note 14, at 172-81.
159. The point here is functionality rather than marketability.
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only metaphorically does one have an automobile. What one really
has is a pile of junk.
The analogy applies equally well to agency. One who is in a persistent vegetative state is like the automobile that is totaled, whereas one
who is in a temporary coma or asleep is like the car in need of gasoline, while the unborn are similar to the raw material awaiting assembly at the automobile plant. I do not mean to suggest that the unborn
are like the raw materials entering an automobile plant with respect to
their importance to society. Clearly, the unborn are distinguishable if
for nothing other than their symbolic significance. 160 However, in the
sense that the unborn are potential and not actual or prospective
agents, the analogy does hold to limit the kinds of claims that can be
made on behalf of the unborn.
What this idea suggests is that the right to die is strongest where the
entity being assisted or allowed to die is not even a potential agent,
especially if keeping the entity alive involves keeping it in unnecessary
pain and suffering. Conversely, the right is weakest where the entity
is a full-fledged agent because the state may have a legitimate interest,
based in protecting autonomy generally (not to mention all the other
interests cited in Glucksberg and Quill), to keep the agent alive. This
brings me to the second situation which requires addressing.
The right to die, along with the state's interest in protecting life,
attaches to a moral standard of autonomy; namely, a moral standard
that our constitutional system ought to protect because it is both an
end of democratic government and a reason for supporting democratic government. 16 1 More precisely, the autonomy principle justified
in this context is the right to perform private acts. In other words, the
right to perform private acts which do not attack the basic interests in
freedom and the well-being of other actors is the idealization of the
autonomy principle at work. 162 Since any act can be said to affect
someone's interest, the key to a prima facie determination that a truly
private act is involved in any given case is whether one can describe
the act without the inclusion of any additional facts or causal theories
that would suggest a conflict with another's basic interests. In stating
basic interest I mean an interest in freedom or well-being excluding
outside facts or social conventions. If a court subsequently deter160. See generally RONAi o DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993) (arguing that a limited
claim-one that would not defeat all abortions-can be made to protect the unborn for the sake
of maintaining the symbolic significance that human life is sacred and should not be too easily
taken).
161. See SAMAR, supra note 14, at 89-90.
162. Id. at 96-97.
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mines, as a matter of fact, that other interests are involved, it must
also determine whether those other interests are important enough to
restrict the privacy at stake. One way to perform this determination,
given that a principle of autonomy can serve as the common denominator for grounding privacy and presumably the other interest the
state is asserting, is for the courts to determine which right or interest
163
better serves autonomy in general.
Since the right to die, under this conception, is a part of the right to
privacy, the autonomy principle that justifies the right to privacy must
also justify the right to die. 164 The grounding here is higher-ordered.
This means that in a democratic society, the right to die can be mitigated only when necessary to protect a competing principle also justified by autonomy. The key point is that the right to die is an active
right, one that provides freedom to perform the action of terminating
one's own life without interference. Consequently, the only time the
right to die can be interfered with is when the state demonstrates that
protecting the right to die will more likely diminish the current level
of overall individual autonomy, including its necessary component of
165
well-being, than protecting the right to die.
In this instance, a compelling state interest is any interest of the
state that is more essential to the protection of autonomy in general
than is protecting, in this context, the right to die. 166 If the state is
seeking to protect a competing principle, for example an interest in
preserving life, then the burden the state will have to shoulder in order to support its interest is to show that preserving life is more essential to the protection of autonomy in general than protecting the
individual's right to die. 1 67 Such an option would likely be true, for
163. Here, I note that the right to privacy will only conflict with other rights or interests in
which autonomy is a common ground. Id. at 103-16. Because the right to die will occasionally
conflict with other rights and interests, it can be regulated on the basis of which right better
promotes, or which interest better protects, autonomy in general. Cf SAMAR, supra note 14, at
104-17; but cf Patrick M. Curran Jr., Note, Regulating Death: Oregon's Death with Dignity Act
and the Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 86 G-o. L.J. 725, 736 (1992) (arguing that
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act cannot be adequately regulated to avoid a slippery slope from
voluntary euthanasia to involuntary euthanasia).
164. For a further discussion of this issue, see SAMAR, supra note 14, at 199-203 (1991).
165. See Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L.

REv. 2021, 2032-37 (1992).
166. See SAMAR, supra note 14, at 199-2)0.
167. See SAMAR, supra note 14, at 112-17. Kamisar argues that the relevant definition of autonomy should be "unwanted bodily intrusion" rather than the private act sense of autonomy I
suggest. See Kamisar, supra note 43, at 489-90; See Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a
Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. Ri-v. 735, 757 (1995).

Elsewhere, I have rejected this

narrower sense of autonomy. See SAMAR, supra note 14, at 56: see also Lawrence 0. Gostin,
Drawing a Line Between Killing and Letting Die: The Law, and Law Reform, on Medically As-
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instance, in the case of an otherwise healthy person, or at least one
who is not ill or in excruciating pain, but who is still sufficiently distraught and wishes to die. It may even be true for the terminally ill
patient who seeks to end his life but is currently not in great pain or
suffering. The point in both of these latter situations is to allow the
state to investigate whether the decision to end one's life is a rational
one. In the former case, it would be necessary to determine whether
the person was acting under a short term, but nevertheless powerful
emotional response to a situation in which relevant alternatives had
not been fully assessed.
In the latter situation, it may be whether the decision is based on
how, for example, one might want to be remembered. This is especially true if the ability to take care of oneself is expected to be increasingly difficult as the disease progresses. Of primary concern
would be that the decision not be based merely on outside factors of
finance, imposition on family members, or foreknowledge that dying
will soon result. Under these circumstances, such factors may be more
coercive than assessable. This means only that some intrusion by the
state for the sake of honest inquiry about one's motivations is justified
to insure that all relevant information, especially about outside financial and other forms of support are known to the patient. However,
the state should not use such reasons as a deceptive disguise to delay a
patient's decision. The intrusion is allowed because, in such a situation, the self's freedom appears to be in conflict with its well-being.
Moreover, under these circumstances, the very nature of the conflict
suggests how any dispute over the patient's decision should get resolved. Since autonomy is the common denominator for both the
right to die and the state's competing interest to preserve life, 68 the
state would have a good reason to intervene for the sake of insuring
that the person was acting rationally where, once again, rationally
means employing canons of inductive and deductive logic with knowledge of relevant circumstances. Once that is done, however, no further intrusion is justified and the state must leave any further decision
up to the individual.
In the case of the psychologically distraught person, the state would
be further justified to require that the person obtain psychological
help before a final decision could be recognized. This would ensure
that any conflict between the self's freedom and well-being is not the
result of some irrational psychological impulse. Even under circumsisted Dying, 21 J.L. MEP. & Er-iics 94, 98 (1993) (arguing for a qualified right to assisted
suicide on the ground that the right to die is a fundamental autonomy right).
168. See SAMAR, supra note 14, at 200.
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stances such as these, there would come an end to the intrusion,
whereby the person was deemed to be psychologically capable of rationally making such a determination.
What does all this say about the right to die? It says that even
though the right to die may be offset in cases such as these, it does not
disappear from our analysis of the situation. It may be transferred to
a back burner, but it remains on the stove. As such, it places a limit
on just how far the state can go in asserting its compelling interest.
This limit is that the maximum intrusion on the right to die is the minimum necessary for the state to achieve its compelling interest. In the
above cases, the limit on the intrusion would be the point where the
person was judged to be rational and not causing harm to others. The
latter would also take into account whether the person was under a
special duty, like a parent to a child, which was incurred voluntarily.
Any further intrusion would unnecessarily diminish, rather than protect, individual autonomy, making all such decisions grounds for placing the individual under the paternalistic control of the state.
Consequently, in the case of the temporary coma, the state's interest in protecting life would appear to outweigh any claimed interest by
a guardian to allow the patient to die. A similar result should occur in
the case of the full-fledged agent who is merely in a distraught state of
mind. On the other hand, if the prospective life of a terminally ill
patient is one of suffering either excruciating pain or medication to
the point of incoherence, the state's interest will not outweigh the individual's right to die. Even in the case of the fully sane and relaxed
individual who has made the decision to die, the state's interest may
not outweigh the individual's interest provided that the individual is
acting rationally with knowledge of relevant circumstances and not in
derogation of any pre-existing duties or responsibilities. Determining
whether the individual is acting in this way, of course, justifies at least
some state intervention to the point of making an adequate mental
and practical judgment based on reasonable medical, psychological,
and other evidence. 169 Beyond such intervention, the problem becomes not only theoretical but practical. How can the state continuously prevent someone who is bent on killing himself from doing so
without an incredible intrusion on his basic liberties? Certainly, the
state can restrict others from assisting in such suicides by criminal penalties. In the case of doctors, the state can revoke their licenses to
practice medicine. However, there is not much else which can or
should be done.
169. Cf. KAMISAR, supra note 43, at 511.
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The purpose of this doctrinal discussion is to illustrate that higherordered moral principles do exist. Future courts can take these principals into account should they be confronted with a more particularized case, as was alluded to by the Justices in the Glucksberg and Quill
decisions. From within the internal point of view, it would not be inappropriate for a future court to move in an orderly fashion to a
higher level of analysis as needed to decide a case. This is the point of
my analysis of the metaprinciple in Glucksberg and Quill. We are by
no means at the end of the line in the realm of the right to die. Glucksberg and Quill are consistent with the door being left open to a judicially broader recognition of a right to die in future cases. Thus, from
both an interpretative understanding of how courts operate and a doctrinal one of the requisite principles available, there will be much
more to do when future cases in this area come along.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have sought to do more than merely regurgitate
recent Supreme Court cases on the right to die. I have sought to place
the entire discussion inside the context of a morality based decisionmaking model that both explains the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Glucksberg and Quill, while at the same time providing a
ground for how the Court might follow a different track without contradiction in a related future line of cases. The approach I have followed, insofar as it engages a meta-theory of legal decision making,
illustrates the need to sometimes move to broader levels of abstraction, as might be indicated by the move from what the law actually
says to society's political morality, to a more modern natural law/natural rights approach. This approach also provides a basis for discerning
under what circumstances any of these moves might be justified in the
right to die area. In future cases involving the right to die, the factual
circumstances may vary considerably from what they were in Glucksberg and Quill. If that happens, the underlying principles protecting
the freedom and well-being of the person seeking to die will not always be following the same route and, consequently, the decisions will
not always be the same. However, in all such cases the decisions
reached will be principled, provided an approach like the one suggested here (or one very similar) is undertaken. Consequently, this
article is offered as a tool to ascertaining a clearer understanding both
of what the Court has done in its recent right to die decisions as well
as what courts and state legislatures might do to ensure a morally
principled development in this area of the law.

